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Abstract
In this paper, we define a Hilbert-style axiom system IPCCA that con-
servatively extends intuitionistic propositional logic (IPC) by adding new
classical atoms for which the law of excluded middle (LEM) holds. We
establish completeness of IPCCA with respect to an appropriate class of
Kripke models. We show that IPCCA is a conservative extension of both
classical propositional logic (CPC) and also IPC. We further investigate the
disjunction property in IPCCA. In particular, we show that the disjunction
property holds for every formula A ∨ B if either A or B does not contain
classical atoms.1
In our previous paper, we discussed the intuitionistic version of a basic Logic
of Proofs [Kurokawa, 2003]. From a semantical point of view the formulas of the
form x : F , denoting x is a proof of F , behave as if they were classical propositions
put on Kripke models of intuitionistic propositional logic. A question appeared
of how we can describe a logic in which we have propositional variables of two
sorts: those that behave classically and those that behave intuitionistically. What
results is a logic that combines many essential features of IPC and CPC.
1The results of this paper were obtained in November 2003. Early in 2004, the author learned
from an FOM posting about A. Sakharov’s paper “Median Logic” (submitted on February 6,
2004 to the Mathematics Preprint Server), on a first-order intuitionistic logic with classical
propositional atoms. In Sakharov’s paper, a relevant proof system with some weak form of
cut-elimination is given. Apart from a common design idea, this paper and “Median Logic” do
not have a significant overlap.
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The present work is not the first attempt at such a blending of the two logics.
We will examine the history of the relationship between IPC and CPC.
There are numerous examples of the so-called “intermediate logics,” which
are obtained from IPC by adding axiom schemas that are weaker than those of
classical logic. For instance, Dummett logic is obtained by adding the axiom
schema (A→ B)∨ (B → A) to IPC. Theorems of this logic are valid in all linear
Kripke models. For a survey of intermediate logics one could look at Chagrov
and Zakharyashev[1997].
Dov Gabbay, in [1999] and other works, has developed a method of combining
logics called “fibring logics”. The scope of this method is extremely general, and
it is applicable to almost any logics which are complete for some sort of possible
world semantics. Its basic idea is the following. Suppose we want to combine
two logics with different logical connectives. When t ° A holds, where t is from
a semantics of one logic and A is a formula of the combined logics whose main
connective is from the other logic, we associate a model of the other logic at the
state t by using a function F, regard A as ‘atomic’ and use the rule t ° A iff
F (t) ° A. By using this idea, we can understand how the two different semantics
are related when we evaluate a formula in a mixed language. In principle, this
idea could be applied to CPC if we consider the semantics of CPC as a degenerate
case of possible world semantics.
However, there is one twist here. In their [1996], Farias del Cerro and Herzig
considered a more specific case that makes use of two types of implication: classi-
cal and intuitionistic. They take the union of the axioms of the both logics based
on the two different implications, and the different impliciations are connected by
a certain bridging axiom. Interestingly enough, they showed that careless com-
bination of these two implications results in a collapse of the system to classical
logic, so some special care must be exercised. In fact, in the same paper, Farias del
Cerro and Herzig give a restricted system that is free from the collapse.2 Though
the work of Farias del Cerro and Herzig was done independently of Gabbay’s idea
of fibring, Gabbay’s approach also needs careful treatment of this case. In his
[1999], Gabbay himself puts a comment on it and refers to their paper about how
to avoid the collapse. 3
Now the question is whether Gabbay’s general approach subsumes our ap-
2They point out that if they accept an unrestricted version of weakening axiom schema, the
system will collapse into a classical system. The formulas substitutable into the schema have
to be restricted.
3In their [2001], Sernadas, Rasga and Carnielli give another method called “modulated
fibring” that can avoid this collapse, following the line of Gabbay’s “fibring” and refining it
by using the language of category theory.
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proach of combining logic by using two kinds of atoms. Our answer to the ques-
tion is that it does not. Gabbay seems to put focus on the case of a combination
of two logics with different ‘logical connectives’. Although Gabbay mentions the
case where he has disjoint sets of atoms, he does not address the issue of directly
restricting the behavior of a set of “atoms” by postulating new axioms regulating
these atoms. So, as far as the current situation of research goes, our approach is
different from Gabbay’s.
In this paper, we emulate classical logic in IPC by adding classical proposi-
tional variables. A new axiom schema Xi ∨ ¬Xi restricts the behavior of these
new propositional variables so that they act classically. We show that our system
contains both IPC and CPC and does not collapse to classical logic.
Now we present a Hilbert-style system for the combined logic and also prove
completeness of this system with respect to a certain class of Kripke models for
intuitionistic logic; namely, we impose additional conditions on the forcing of the
new (classical) propositional variables.
The language of IPCCA consists of the usual intuitionistic propositional con-
nectives and two sets of propositional variables: intuitionistic propositional vari-
ables
V arI := {p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn}
and classical propositional variables
V arC := {X1, . . . , Xn} .
The latter variables will satisfy an additional constraint that will provide for
their classical behavior. In the following, we denote the language of propositional
with variables in V arI , V arC and V arI ∪ V arC as LV arI , LV arC and LV arI∪V arC
respectively.
Definition 1 IPCCA consists of the following axioms and rules.
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• Axioms of intuitionistic propositional logic
1. A→ (B → A)
2. (A→ (B → C))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C))
3. A ∧B → A, A ∧B → B
4. A→ A ∨B, B → A ∨B
4IPCCA is based on the Hilbert-style system of IPC, see [Trolestra and Schwichtenberg,
1996].
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5. (A→ C)→ ((B → C)→ ((A ∨B)→ C))
6. A→ (B → (A ∧B))
7. ⊥ → A
• Axioms for classical propositional variables5
Xi ∨ ¬Xi
• Modus ponens
A A→ B
B
Our Kripke-style semantics for IPCCA is obtained by extending the forcing
relation of IPC Kripke models to include our new classical propositional variables
Xi. In particular, a model K is a triple (K,≤,°), where K is a set of states, ≤
a partial order on K, and ° a relation on K × (V arI ∪ V arC). Without loss of
generality, we assume that K is a forest with respect to the ordering ≤. We will
denote roots of this forest by rk. Additionally, ° satisfies:
• Monotonicity of intuitionistic propositional variables
if α ° pi and α ≤ β then β ° pi.
• The new condition for classical atoms For each Xi and for each root
rk ∈ K, exactly one of the following holds:
– β ° Xi for all β ≥ rk
– β 1 Xi for all β ≥ rk
We extend the forcing relation ° in the usual way to include all formulas of
the language IPCCA. Namely, for α ∈ K,
• α 1 ⊥
• α ° A ∧B iff α ° A and α ° B
• α ° A ∨B iff α ° A or α ° B
• α ° A→ B iff β ° A implies β ° B for all β ≥ α
We now prove the soundness of IPCCA.
5¬X is an abbreviation for X → ⊥.
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Theorem 2 (Soundness) If IPCCA ` A, then K, α ° A for all models K =
(K,≤,°) and for all α ∈ K.
Before going into the proof of the theorem, we will state and prove the follow-
ing small lemma.
Lemma 3 (Extended Monotonicity) Let C be a formula and K = (K,≤,°)
be a model. For all α, β ∈ K with β ≥ α, α ° C implies β ° C.
Proof By induction on the complexity of the formula. Case 1) Both A and B
consist of propositional variables from V arI . Subcase 1.1. C = A ∧B. Suppose
α ° A ∧ B and α ≤ β. Then, α ° A and α ° B. By IH, β ° A and β ° B.
So β ° A ∧ B Subcase 1.2. C = A ∨ B is similar. Subcase 1.3. C = A → B.
Suppose α ° A → B and α ≤ β. Also, suppose that δ ≥ β and δ ° A to show
δ ° B. By transitivity, α ≤ δ. By definition, for all γ ≥ α, γ ° A ⇒ γ ° B.
Take δ as γ. Then, δ ≥ α ⇒ (δ ° A ⇒ δ ° B). So we have δ ° B. This allows
us to conclude β ° A→ B.
Case 2) At least one of A, Bin C contains classical variables Xi from V arC .
The only difference is that at least one of the propositional variables is Xi. If
Xi is forced at one node in a tree, then it will be forced everywhere in the tree.
So Xi’s are also trivially monotonic. So we do not have to make any difference
about our induction hypothesis, since that automatically holds, too. Each case
of induction is completely similar to purely intuitionistic case. £
Now we get into the proof of the soundness theorem.
Proof of Soundness We need to show that all the axioms are valid for the above
class of Kripke models and to show that the inference rule preserves validity. Since
the class of our Kripke models is the class of usual Kripke models for intuitionistic
propositional logic with some additional language and conditions and all classical
propositional variables satisfy the axioms for intuitionistic propositional logic,
we are essentially done for the IPC part of the axioms. Also, the rule of modus
ponens preserves validity w.r.t. the class of our Kripke models. Suppose a formula
A of IPCCA is valid w.r.t. our class of models and A→ B in IPCCA is also valid
in the same class of models. So, for all K and α ∈ K, K, α ° A and for all
K and all α ∈ K, K, α ° A → B. So for all K, the following holds. For all
β ≥ α, β ° A ⇒ β ° B. Also, by the first assumption, for all β ≥ α, α ° A. So
for all β ≥ α, α ° B. However, since α is arbitrary, for all α ∈ K, α ° B. So
for all K, α ° B. so B is valid.(The proof is essentially the same as that for IPC)
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The rest of the task is to show that one axiom schema for V arC is valid w.r.t.
Kripke models above.
Next, We want to prove the axiom Xi∨¬Xi is valid w.r.t. our Kripke models.
Suppose there exist a model K and a state α such that α 1 Xi∨¬Xi. By extended
monotonicity, at a root node rk 1 Xi∨¬Xi. Then, we have rk 1 Xi and rk 1 ¬Xi.
By rk 1 ¬Xi and the recursive clause for negation, we get ∃γ ≥ rk, γ ° Xi. On the
other hand, we have the condition for classical atoms, i.e. either ∀β ≥ rk, β ° Xi
or ∀β ≥ rk, β 1 Xi. The second disjunct of the new condition of the model
contradicts ∃γ ≥ rk, γ ° Xi. So we have ∀β ≥ rk, β ° Xi. Now we take rk as an
instance of β. Then rk 1 Xi, since ≥ is reflexive. Thus, we have both rk 1 Xi
and rk ° Xi. This is a contradiction. This suffices to show the validity of the
axiom for classical propositional variables. £
We now proceed to the completeness theorem.
Theorem 4 (Completeness) If a formula A is valid in all models K, then
IPCCA ` A.
Proof We prove the contrapositive of the statement of completeness. By con-
struction of the canonical model by way of Kripke model for IPC and modifying
that. Suppose IPCCA 0 A. Take the set of all the subformulas of A, and call
it Sb(A). Let X0, X1, ..., Xn be the list of all classical propositional variables in
Sb(A). And let q0, q1, ..., qn be sentence variables not occurring in X. To every
B ∈ Sb(A), we associate a formula of the language of propositional logic Bt such
that B is the result of substituting all those occurrences of Xi for qi throughout
Bt for all i with 0 ≤ i ≤ n. In other words, Bt is a formula such that if we
substitute qi for all occurrences of Xi for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n in B, then we get Bt. So
we have the following situation here.
• Bt is a formula in the language of usual intuitionistic propositional logic.
• B is the result of substituting Xi for qi for all i with 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Then consider the following sentences.
1. qi ∨ ¬qi for all i s.t. 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Obviously, substituting Xi for qi in the above formulas would give us the
axioms for classical part of IPCCA. Make the conjunction of these.∧
0≤i≤n(Xi ∨ ¬Xi).
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Then the following meta-statement holds between formulas of IPCCA and those
of IPC.
IPC ` ∧0≤i≤n(qi ∨ ¬qi)→ At ⇒ IPCCA ` A.
Here we are assuming IPCCA 0 A. So we have
IPC 0
∧
0≤i≤n(qi ∨ ¬qi)→ At.
Then there exists a finite tree model of IPC (by means of Kripke completeness
theorem and the finite tree theorem for IPC) [Smorynski,1973].
So, for some finite tree Kripke model based on a canonical model construction
K = (K,≤,°) with the root node r, r 1 ∧0≤i≤n(qi ∨ ¬qi)→ At.
So there exists a β ≥ r, β ° ∧0≤i≤n(qi ∨ ¬qi) and β 1 At.
Here we want to define a new model that makes the above two statements
true and has β as the root node.
First, take the cone above β and define a submodel of our original model.
Call it Kβ := (Kβ,≤β,°β), where Kβ = {α ∈ K : α ≥ β}, ≥β=≥ ∩(Kβ ×Kβ),
°β=°¹ (Kβ × LV arI ). Obviously, this model satisfies our desired condition.
Next, based on this submodel Kβ, we define a new model. We are still based
on a modified canonical model construction for IPC. We now change the model Kβ
for IPC into IPCCA by changing qi into Xi everywhere it is necessary. Since our
states consist of saturated set of formulas, we need to change all the occurrence
of qi in the saturated sets in Kβ into Xi. We call a new set of states as K∗β. Then,
our partial order gets automatically changed, since it is just an inclusion relation
between saturated sets. We call our new partial order as ≤∗β. Finally, we define
a new forcing relation. The new forcing relation is defined by the following. For
all γ ∈ K∗β,
• γ °∗β Xi ­ γ °β pi if pi = qi. 6
• γ °∗β pi ­ γ °β pi if pi 6= qi.
6When we move from K∗β to Kβ , we no longer have the same states in the two models, since
each state of the model K∗β has to be changed systematically, i.e. Xi should be changed to qi
at each occurrence. So, officially, we should use different symbols for states, but for the sake of
simplicity, we keep using the same lower case Greek letters for states.
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• °∗β satisfies the conditions of the recursive clauses for the intuitionistic con-
nectives.
Based on this definition, we claim
Claim 5 In K∗β, for any γ ∈ K∗β and for all formulas F , γ °∗β F ⇔ γ °β F t.
Proof By induction on the complexity of the formulas. Case 1. Atoms. 1.1.
F = Xi. By definition, γ °∗β Xi ⇔ γ °β qi ⇔ γ °β F t. 1.2. F = pi. By
definition, γ °∗β pi ⇔ γ °β F t. (Here t is vacuous.) Case 2. F = A ∧ B. Then
γ °∗β A∧B ⇔ γ °∗β A and γ °∗β B ⇔ (IH)γ °β At and γ °β Bt ⇔ γ °β (A∧B)t.
Case 3. F = A ∨ B. This case is similar to conjunction. Case 4. F = A → B.
γ °∗β A → B ⇔ ∀δ ≥ γ, δ °∗β A ⇒ δ °∗β B ⇔ (IH)∀δ ≥ γ, γ °β At ⇒ γ °β
Bt ⇔ γ °β (A→ B)t. £
By this claim, we now have β 1∗β A. We have constructed a particular model.
So we can claim that there is such a model K. By taking the contrapositive, we
have shown (for all K and for all α, K, α ° A)⇒ IPCCA ` A.
The only remaining thing is to check whether this model K∗β = (K∗β,≤∗β,°∗β)
satisfies the condition of a model for IPCCA. The only condition we need to check
is that for any Xi ∈ V arC , [(∀γ ∈ K∗β, γ °∗β Xi) or (∀γ ∈ K∗β, γ 1∗β Xi)].
Claim 6 For any Xi ∈ Sb(A), exactly one of the following holds:
• γ °∗β Xi for all γ ≥∗β β
• γ 1∗β Xi for all γ ≥∗β β
Proof Suppose not for contradiction. Then for some Xi,∃γ ≥∗β β, γ 1∗β Xi and
∃γ ≥∗β β, γ °∗β Xi. Pick a particular γ1 s.t. γ1 ≥∗β β and γ1 1∗β Xi. Also, pick a
particular γ2 s.t. γ2 ≥∗β β and γ2 °∗β Xi. By the above definition of our partial
order ≥∗β and our forcing relation °∗β, γ1 ≥β β and γ1 1β qi. In the same way,
we get γ2 ≥β β and γ2 °β qi. However, in the above argument to establish the
completeness of IPCCA, our °β satisfies the condition that β °β
∧
0≤i≤n(qi∨¬qi).
In particular, β °β qi ∨ ¬qi. So β °β qi or β °β ¬qi. Since Kβ is a submodel of
K, monotonicity still holds in Kβ. So by monotonicity of the case where β °β qi,
γ1 °β qi, which is contradictory to γ1 1β qi. Also, β °β ¬qi implies that for all
δ ≥β β, δ 1β qi. In particular, γ2 1β qi, which is contradictory to γ2 °β qi. So,
anyways we get a contradiction. £
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Now, we have completed the proof of Kripke completeness for IPCCA. £
Next, we state some important properties of IPCCA.
Definition 7 Let S be a logic in the language L. Let S ′ be a logic in a language
L′ ⊇ L. S ′ is called a conservative extension of S if whenever A is a formula in
language L and S ′ ` A, then S ` A.
Now we prove the following two statements.
Theorem 8 IPCCA is a conservative extension of IPC.
Theorem 9 IPCCA is a conservative extension of CPC.
Proof Proof of the former theorem. We show for any A ∈ LV arI , IPC 0 A ⇒
IPCCA 0 A. By means of Kripke completeness and soundness of both logics, it
suffices to prove the following.
Proposition 10 If for an IPC model K = (K,≤,°) and some α ∈ K we have
α 1 A, then there exists a model K∗β with a state γ ≥∗β β such that γ 1∗β A, where
β is a node of a finite tree model K such that β ° ∧0≤i≤n(qi ∨ ¬qi) as above.
Proof Suppose for some K and for some α ∈ K,α 1 A. By the finite tree
theorem, we can construct a finite tree model from K. For the sake of simplicity,
we also call the finite tree model as K. So, for some finite tree Kripke model K
for IPC with the root node ri, K, ri 1∗ A. Since A ∈ LV arI ,
∧
0≤i≤n(qi ∨ ¬qi) in
the construction of a model K∗β is an empty conjunction. So we do not have to
worry about β that is not identical with ri in K itself. We can simply take ri of
K as β, so our model K∗β is K itself. So there exists K∗β and γ s.t. γ ≥∗β β, γ 1∗β A.
£
Now if IPC 0 A, then by the completeness theorem, for some K and α ∈ K,
α 1 A. By the proposition, for some K∗β and some γ ≥∗β β, γ 1∗β A. By the
soundness theorem of IPCCA, IPCCA 0 A. £ (Theorem 8)
Proof Proof of the latter theorem. We want to show for B ∈ LV arC , CPC 0
B ⇒ IPCCA 0 B. By Kripke soundness of IPCCA and completeness of CPC, it
suffices to show the following.
Proposition 11 If for a model M of CPC we have M 2 B, then there exists a
model K∗β with a state γ ≥∗β β such that γ 1∗β B.
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Proof Suppose for some model of classical propositional logicM,M 2 B. Since
B ∈ LV arC , if we consider the behavior of B as a formula of IPCCA, it is entirely
determined by whether it is forced or not at the root node of a model of IPCCA.
This means that a degenerate Kripke model K∗β for IPCCA with only one state β,
partial order {< β, β >} and valuation β ° p⇔M ² p makes the same formula
true asM does. By supposition for the proposition and by using this degenerate
Kripke model, we have K∗β, β 1∗β B. £
Now if we have CPC 0 B, then for some M,M 2 B. So by the proposition,
we have some K∗β with one node β, s.t. β 1∗β B. So we have IPCCA 0 B.
£(Theorem 9)
Let us think about the consequence of these conservativeness results. Theorem
8 above essentially suffices to show that IPCCA does not collapse to classical logic,
i.e. it is not the case that classical laws hold for all formulas of LV arI∪V arC . We
can easily see this by using a simple example of formulas with LV arI that is not
provable in IPCCA but would be provable if we took the logical connectives as
classical.
Corollary 12 IPCCA 0 p ∨ ¬p
Proof p∨¬p ∈ LV arI , and by conservativeness we have IPC 0 p∨¬p⇒ IPCCA 0
p ∨ ¬p. But 0 p ∨ ¬p. So IPCCA 0 p ∨ ¬p. £
Next, we show that a certain version of the disjunction property holds for this
logic. First, we need to introduce the following notions.
Definition 13 Let FI be a formula that has no classical atoms. Let FC be a
formula that has classical atoms and no intuitionistic atoms. Let FM be a formula
containing both intuitionistic and classical atoms.
Theorem 14 (The Disjunction Property, DP)
1. IPCCA ` FI ∨GI ⇒ IPCCA ` FI or IPCCA ` GI
2. IPCCA ` FI ∨GM ⇒ IPCCA ` FI or IPCCA ` FM
3. IPCCA ` FM ∨GM ; IPCCA ` FM or IPCCA ` GM
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Proof The key idea of the proof is to apply “the gluing method” of two (tree-
style) Kripke models into one Kripke model.
First of all, we consider the contrapositive of each statement. By completeness
theorem, there must be a model for each formula F and G s.t. K1, r1 1∗r1 F and
K2, r2 1∗r2 G, (where ri (i=1 or 2) is the root node for each model). We will try
to combine these two models into one model that is a model of F ∨ G. Here is
how we do it.
1. Add one node rk with no intuitionistic variables forced below the two root
nodes of the two Kripke models of F and G.
2. Extend the p.o.’s of the models to K ∪ {rk} by putting all the necessary
ordered pairs into the p.o. and combine them into a new p.o. with the root
node rk.
3. Then, we may have one glued Kripke model if we can successfully define a
new forcing relation, though we may fail. Whether the theorem holds or
not depends on whether both of F and G contain classical variables or not.
(1) If we do not have any classical variables in either F or G, then we can
safely do the gluing procedure of the two models into one in a consistent
manner, since at rk we force neither F nor G.
(2) If we have classical variables in only one of F and G, then we first parse
the formula by using a forcing condition of the formula and check whether
a variable is forced at the root node or not. If we find it forced at the
root by the forcing condition of the entire formula containing the variable,
then we have to force it variables at rk. Otherwise, we just leave the model
unchanged. This change does not affect the other formula, since the other
formula has nothing to do with the newly forced classical variable. So we
can glue two models in a consistent manner in this case, too.
However, if we have any classical variables in both F and G, then it may
be the case that we have some conflict about the forcing relation for Xi,
because we need to have either Xi or ¬Xi in all connected nodes by the
definition of our models of IPCCA. So gluing does not necessarily work in
this case and in general we may not be able to get a new glued model.
Now we go through all the cases. Note that though we define FC , FM sepa-
rately, all the cases of FC in this theorem can be treated as a special case of FM
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where FM has no intuitionistic propositional variables. By regarding FC as a spe-
cial case of FM , we can reduce the number of cases in the theorem and the proof.
Case 1) This is just the same as DP in IPC.
Case 2) If Xi in GM (or GC) is forced at rM , then do gluing with forcing Xi
at rk. If Xi is not forced at rM , then do gluing without Xi at rk. The resulting
model will be a model K, s.t. K, rk 1 FI ∨GM .
For the case 3), there may be a conflict between forcing Xi at r1 and forcing
Xi at r2, because we may have classical variables forced at all the nodes in one
model and in the other model we may have negation of these forced at all the
nodes. We may not be able to construct a new model with the desired property.
So DP does not necessarily hold in the case 3). Here we will give a particular
counter example for this case.
We will show the case where both FM , GM have classical variables and in-
tutionisitic variables in detail. In other cases where one of them has (or both
have) only classical variables, we have obvious counter examples such as IPCCA `
X∨¬X and IPCCA ` X∨ (X → p). Now we have (X → p)∨(p→ X) as a counter
example. We claim that IPCCA ` (X → p) ∨ (p→ X) and IPCCA 0 X → p and
IPCCA 0 p → X. We can prove the formula purely syntactically.7 We give an
example of a deduction using IPCCA, since we have not done any in this paper.
1. IPCCA ` X → (p→ X) Ax.1
2. IPCCA ` X → ((p→ X)→ (X → p) ∨ (p→ X)) Ax.4, Ax.1, MP
3. IPCCA ` X → ((X → p) ∨ (p→ X)) L1, L2, MP
4. IPCCA ` X → (⊥ → p) Ax.1, Ax.7, MP
5. IPCCA ` (X → ⊥)→ (X → p) L4, Ax.2, MP
6. IPCCA ` ¬X → (X → p) by Def. of ⊥
7. IPCCA ` ¬X → ((X → p)→ ((X → p) ∨ (p→ X))) Ax.4, Ax.1, MP
7Here is one remark about a semantics of this formula. This formula is an analogue of
Dummett formula in the context of intermediate logic. In our semantics, we do not have to
take linear ordered models in order to validate this formula.
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8. IPCCA ` ¬X → ((X → p) ∨ (p→ X)) L6, L7, Ax.2, MP
9. IPCCA ` (X ∨¬X)→ ((X → p)∨ (p→ X)) L3, L8, Ax.5, MP
10. IPCCA ` (X → p) ∨ (p→ X) Ax. for V arC , MP
Now we construct a counter model for each disjunct. For X → p, we can take
any model in which r1 1 p and ∀β ≥ r1, β ° X. For p → X, we can take any
model in which r2 ° p and ∀β ≥ r2, β ° X. Each of them is obviously a counter
model of the respective formula, and we cannot glue them into one model because
of the conditions for X.
These counter examples are sufficient to show that the case 3) does not hold
in general. £
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